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In this paper I provide an analysis of the implementation of “recovery” as a policy object and 
commitment in the UK. This can be situated as part of the New Labour government’s (1997-
2010) reform of the NHS during the 2000s. Through a textual analysis of policy and 
legislation from this time I draw out a tension between contemporary ideals of choice and 
autonomy in healthcare and the specificities of a mental healthcare system in which 
psychiatrists are legislatively empowered to treat patients without their consent. In the UK, 
evidence continues to show that the most economically and socially disadvantaged members 
of British society are most likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act 2007. This 
paper provides an intersectional analysis of the ways in which policy, legislation and 
psychiatrization enact particular subjects as ‘failed’ citizens. Following Tyler (2010; 2013), I 
argue that these practices of exclusion and detainment are constituent elements of neoliberal 
state-making, which are discriminatory and unjust.   
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Recovery-as-policy as a form of neoliberal state-making 
Introduction 
The contemporary emergence of recovery as a conceptual frame, and as a set of practices 
and policy orientations, encapsulates on-going and inter-related debates concerning madness 
and its management. Recovery raises questions about what kinds of lives are liveable and 
how conditions for those lives might be achieved (Butler, 2004). The history of recovery has 
multiple threads and is still in process; it cannot be understood to belong to any particular 
moment or movement in mental health. It can be found in the eighteenth century moral 
treatment or psychiatric rehabilitation that Michel Foucault ([1961] 2001) so strongly 
criticised, in the campaigns of twentieth century mental health activists and psychiatric 
survivors, and in twenty-first century policy documents.  
In my doctoral research into recovery, which provides the basis for this paper, I have 
found Dutch scholar Annemarie Mol’s (2005) concept of enactment useful in articulating 
how there is no singular “recovery”. Instead different kinds of recovery are brought into 
being through different social and material practices. Recovery is not one thing with multiple 
meanings. Rather, different practices bring different enactments of “recovery” into existence. 
This conceptualisation of recovery helps to elicit how not all enactments of “recovery” are 
equal. Because recovery is multiple, this entails relations of power; certain enactments of 
recovery will marginalise or obscure others depending upon the context (Moser, 2008).  
Recovery has become a central feature of mental health policies in many countries, 
including England, USA, Canada, New Zealand, Scotland, and Australia, and it is beginning 
to emerge in other European countries.
1
 As such, it is often referred to as the current 
                                                          
1
 According to Slade, Amering & Oades (2008), the following policies include a commitment to recovery-orientated mental health practice: 
Australia’s National Mental Health Plan 2003-2008 (Australian Health Ministers, 2003); The Journey to Recovery – The Government’s 
Vision of Mental Health Care (Department of Health, 2001) in England ; Blueprint for Mental Health Services in New Zealand (The Mental 
Health Commission, 1998); A Vision for a Recovery Model in Irish Mental Health Services (Mental Health Commission, 2005); and the 
New Freedom Commission on Mental Health’s Achieving the Promise: Transforming Mental Health Care in America (2003).  
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international “buzzword” in mental health (see, for example, Clay, 1999; Bracken & Thomas, 
2005; Craig, 2008). Academic recovery literature has proliferated, with papers found across 
journals relating to psychiatry, psychology, psychiatric rehabilitation, clinical psychology, 
occupational therapy and social work. Authors from different disciplinary and experiential 
backgrounds with different agendas writing about the phenomenon of recovery have 
observed that the concept elides a clear or singular definition (see for example, Davidson, et 
al., 2006; Le Boutillier, et al., 2011). In this academic and policy literature, this lack of 
conceptual clarity is represented as a “problem” that must be solved in order to facilitate the 
implementation of recovery in practice.  
Since recovery’s uptake in UK mental health policy, key figures charged with its practical 
implementation have worked up and widely circulated their own definitions. These authors 
have addressed the “problem” of conceptual ambiguity by classifying different types of 
recovery. A notable example is Mike Slade, a clinical psychologist who leads the REFOCUS 
on Recovery study at the Institute for Psychiatry at King’s College, London, which is funded 
by the National Institute for Health Research. Slade (2009) has made the distinction between 
“clinical recovery” and “personal recovery”. Clinical recovery is defined by clinicians based 
on reduction of symptoms, whereas personal recovery is defined by the person who is 
recovering.
2
 This example shows how recovery can be defined in such a way as to retain 
medical expertise and make individuals responsible for their own recovery. Those with 
access to material and institutional power have been able to use recovery’s conceptual 
ambiguity to realign recovery with current dominant biomedical models of mental health and 
illness. Social justice enactments of recovery, which advocate for demedicalized and 
                                                          
2 In her brief history of the concept of recovery, Nora Jacobson notes that this ‘bifurcation of recovery’ (2004, p. 51) has been implicit in 
mental healthcare since the early eighteenth century when William Tuke, founder of the York Retreat (1796 – present), distinguished 
between patients who were cured and those who were recovered. For Tuke, ‘cure was what doctors did to patients; recovery was what 
happened to patients with the help of nature alone’ (Jacobson, 2004, p. 50). Later, during Kraepelin and Bleuler’s respective research into 
dementia praecox, the terms ‘“[r]ecovery with defect” and “healing with scarring”’ (ibid.) were created to explain cases that did not fit with 
the prognosis of inevitable deterioration. 
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collectivist approaches to madness and distress, are variously marginalised, co-opted and re-
scripted through struggles over the term’s definition. Instead of the social change recovery-
based rights activism sought to bring about, existing practices are merely tweaked and re-
branded “recovery-orientated”. 
At best, then, we can assert that recovery is a site of contested meaning. At worst, it is a 
discourse implicated in the continued marginalisation, medicalisation and exclusion of “mad” 
people. There is a growing dissatisfaction with recovery amongst mad-identified and mad-
positive scholars and activists who argue that a social justice enactment of recovery has been 
politically neutralised, taken over by the very institutions it sought to challenge, and used to 
negative effect in service-users’ lives (see for example, Harper & Speed, 2012; Howell 
&Voronka 2012; Morrow, 2013; Morrow & Weisser 2012; Rose 2014; Trivedi, 2010). For 
several authors, recovery has become ‘deeply embedded with both the economic and the 
social imperatives of contemporary neoliberalism’ (Voronka & Howell, 2012: 5; see also 
Rose, 2014; Morrow & Weisser, 2012; Morrow 2013). However, although some work has 
sought to situate recovery in the neoliberal context (Morrow 2013; Poole 2011), there is still a 
need to further unpick this entanglement.  
This paper contributes an account of the enactment of recovery-as-policy in the UK as a 
form of neoliberal state-making that is discriminatory and unjust, in that it is ‘designed to 
fail’ (Tyler 2010) some (notably ethnic minorities and/or people living in poverty) more than 
others. I present a textual analysis of mental health policy and law introduced by the New 
Labour government during the 2000s. I argue that recovery has been used to create a space 
through which to usher in increasingly regulatory and oppressive mental health legislation 
that ‘produce and police social difference’ (Lloyd, Mitchelson, and Burridge, 2012, p. 9). I 
begin by outlining the changes to the British National Health Service’s (NHS) mental health 
system by New Labour. Their mobilisation of a discourse of modernisation and progress in 
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the documents outlining these changes obfuscates the proliferation of psychiatric- and state-
power signalled therein. Ideals of choice and citizenship are then unpacked in order to 
illustrate how mental health services can be read as a state border, through which certain 
people are excluded. In spite of continued pronouncements that these changes were modern 
and better, I show that there is little new about a system that continues to repress and restrain 
impoverished people. I conclude by asking if the ensuing re-institutionalisation in mental 
health that followed New Labour’s reform can be understood as part of a wider neoliberal 
global complex of detention, producing failed subjects through which to accumulate profit 
and control populations.  
New Labour ‘Modernise’ the NHS 
In 2000, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair, New Labour invested in 
reforming the National Health Service.
3
 The Department of Health published The NHS Plan 
(2000) pledging significant funds towards supporting changes to the NHS, ensuring it would 
be ‘modernised from top to toe’ (Department of Health, 2000, p. 9). The changes signalled in 
this plan were ‘to give the people of Britain a health service fit for the 21st century: a health 
service designed around the patient’ (Department of Health, 2000, p. 1). Key elements of this 
reform were: that the health service would be decentralised, devolving control to local 
providers whose performance would be assessed according to new National Service 
Frameworks; that health and social services would work together in order to address the 
social context of health problems and improve the overall health and wellbeing of the nation; 
and, that patients would be involved in shaping service development. 
 
                                                          
3
 The National Health Service was founded in 1948 in Britain. Its central principles were: ‘the health service will 
be available to all and financed entirely from taxation, which means that people pay into it according to their 
means’ (NHS website, 2015). 
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In light of this reform, Julie Repper & Rachel Perkins (2009) announced that:  
The concept of recovery in mental health captures the key elements outlined in 
government health policy: a focus on the individual and their wants, wishes and 
concerns; the inter-relationships between health and social facets of people’s lives; the 
importance of choice and control; the importance of promoting wellbeing and social 
inclusion and helping people to live the lives they want to lead. (p. 4)  
For these authors, the future that activists had been fighting for was here. This optimism that 
“things can only get better,” as the New Labour election soundtrack enthused, saturates the 
literary style of government policy of the time.
4
  There is an emphatic reiteration of words 
such as “new” and “modern” throughout, affirming the Labour party’s novelty indicated in 
the name New Labour.
5
  
In 2001, the Department of Health published a summary of the changes made to mental 
health policy for those indirectly involved with mental health services, such as the police or 
voluntary sector organisations. It was entitled The Journey to Recovery – The Government’s 
Vision for Mental Health Care, an artful amalgam of the metaphors of maps and journeys in 
activist writings about recovery that assert expertise through experience (see for example 
Barker, Campbell, & Davidson, 1999; The Icarus Project, 2013) and William A. Anthony’s 
(1993) famous assertion that recovery was the new “guiding vision” for mental health service 
provision in 1990s USA.  In the Department of Health’s (2001) document, however, this new 
‘vision’ now belongs to the New Labour government (not to activists), and infers 
‘statesmanlike foresight’ and imagination (OED, 2015).  
                                                          
4
 The song ‘Things Can Only Get Better’ by pop group D:REAM (1993) was used by New Labour in their election campaign in 1997. 
5
 New Labour refers specifically to the years 1994-2010. The ‘New’ was removed from the parties name when Labour lost a general 
election to a coalition of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. 
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In her foreword to The Journey to Recovery, then Secretary of State for Health Jacqui Smith 
details how the new investment of £700,000,000 in community mental health would ‘put 
right, over time, the neglect of mental health services in the past . . . [by] . . . modernising 
[them]’ (Department of Health, 2001, p. 1). A key element of this would be mental health and 
social services working more closely together. This locates modern mental healthcare in the 
community and situates the neglect that took place firmly within the asylums of the past. It 
also implies a broader understanding of the social factors involved in health. Smith’s brief 
introduction evokes criticisms of the medicalisation of distress and of institutionalisation. 
Nevertheless, Smith situates mental health as a ‘clinical priority,’ (ibid.) and the rest of the 
document continues to place psychiatric discourse at the centre of the system. Rather 
obliquely, Smith closes with the assertion that: ‘We have set out on the road to recovery’ 
(ibid.). Given the designated audience and the assertion that recovery is a clinical priority, it 
seems likely that the “we” Smith is referring to is the mental health system itself, which 
needs to find “new” and “better” ways of delivering its services.  
In their introduction to the document, John Mahoney and Antony Sheehan, then joint 
Heads of Mental Health in the Department of Health, expand on the neglect of mental health 
services referred to by Smith. They assert that: 
For much of the past hundred years, decaying, depressing old hospitals housed far too 
many people – often far from their homes – for long periods. Out of hospital, people 
with mental health problems received little or no help. (Department of Health, 2001, 
p. 3) 
In this passage, it is not psychiatric practices which are deemed to be failed or flawed, but 
rather the institutions in which psychiatry was practised – the ‘decaying, depressing [and] 
old’ (ibid.) Victorian buildings that characterised the “great confinement” in Britain. The 
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picture Mahoney and Sheehan paint erases psychiatric practices from this history of neglect, 
and this continues: 
In part, this has been due to misplaced attitudes. In the public mind, “madness” has 
too often been quite wrongly equated to “badness”. Society has shunned and excluded 
those affected, often denying them work, a decent chance in life, and respect. 
(Department of Health, 2001, p. 3) 
According to Mahoney and Sheehan stigma, the equation between mental illness and danger, 
and social exclusion may be the ‘legacy of large institutions’ (ibid.), but it is the public who 
have ‘misplaced attitudes’ (ibid.). There is no recognition that psychiatry informs rather than 
reflects public understandings of mental health (Campbell 1996). 
The Journey to Recovery continually evokes a shameful history of large institutions and 
the failure of care in the community. A brief history of the mental health system in Britain is 
provided in the section entitled A Century of Slow Progress (Department of Health, 2001, p. 
4) to substantiate the need for New Labour’s proposed changes. It states that the Victorian 
asylums were built with good intentions but quickly became ‘overcrowded and awful places’ 
(ibid.). By the beginning of the National Health Service in 1948, the asylums were little 
changed. According to the authors of this potted history, the discovery of ‘new, more 
effective, medication’ (ibid.) and the 1959 Mental Health Act  led to ‘people receiving care 
outside of the traditional hospital setting’ (ibid.), whilst ‘from the 1970s acute wards in 
district general hospitals offered an alternative to institutionalisation’ (ibid.). Finally, by the 
1990s, they assert that the new system of community care was in ‘chaos’ (ibid.) There are 
repeated references throughout this brief history to both hospitals and the community being 
‘bleak’, ‘neglected’, ‘shabby’, ‘depressing’, ‘awful’ (ibid.) environments for people with 
mental health problems. These are reiterated in concordance with the assertion that lack of 
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funds - ‘a cash-starved NHS’, ‘resources not always reinvested in mental health care’ (ibid.) – 
were primarily to blame for these desperate situations. This history justifies the government 
investment of a significant amount of funding into the mental health system, but, as I will 
show in detail below, it also justifies the retention of psychiatry at the heart of that system.  
The framing of the mental health system as “in crisis” presented in The Journey to Recovery 
is both economic and ideological.
6
 As Voronka (2008) has argued, psychiatry ‘sits on a 
precarious credibility ... [requiring] constant re-legitimation in order to hold stable its 
assertions that madness is a problem of science and disease’. Indeed, psychiatrists themselves 
continue to debate their own discipline’s validity and practices (see for example, Bracken et 
al 2012; Oyebode & Humphries 2011). The Journey to Recovery’s particular historiography 
of the UK’s mental health system is performative, legitimating a continued investment in a 
biomedical model of “mental illness”. The logic proceeds thus: If one believes that psychiatry 
is in “crisis” then it must change either by becoming more “scientific” or more “recovery-
focussed,” and if the mental health system has been neglectful, then it must be “modernised.”  
In using the metaphor of “recovery” to describe the modernisation of mental health 
services in “crisis”, policy-makers appear to listen to patient voices. However, the history of 
user/survivor activism is precisely silenced in this policy commitment. Their challenges to 
concepts such as ‘lack of insight’, their critiques of the medicalisation of distress, forced 
treatment and detainment, and their assertion of expertise by experience are eradicated. 
Indeed, as I will show below, the uptake of recovery-as-policy can be seen as a direct 
response to the challenges posed by user-survivor activism, in which the ‘relations of 
domination have been restructured’ (Lloyd et al., 2012, p. 5).  
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 I am not proposing that these are distinct from each other. 
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The Empowerment of Psychiatry  
The history provided by The Journey to Recovery details the transformation of the public 
mental health system from custody to medical care as ultimately empowering for patients. As 
I have shown above, the history presented moves from denigrating institutionalisation to 
advocating for psychiatric wards as the best alternative, and is therefore able to depict lack of 
hospital beds as problematic. The large public asylums of the Victorian era are therefore 
conflated with neglect, whilst lack of space within new psychiatric services is also found to 
be neglectful. The history of the mental health system presented in The Journey to Recovery 
therefore draws focus to the places of neglect (in asylums or wards or communities), but not 
the practices of psychiatry that activists have described as ‘state sanctioned torture’ (The 
Kissit! XX Campaign Against Psychiatric Assault 2006). This is because the government 
intended to strengthen these practices.  
This way of telling the history of mental health services relies upon a false distinction 
between custody and care. What is missing from this account is how mental distress and 
madness came to be widely understood both as health problems that require medical 
intervention and social problems that require legislation. By exploring this, I offer a different 
perspective that shows this so-called “Century of Slow Progress” to be a story of psychiatric 
(and state/law) empowerment. In the name of recovery, then, many of the amendments 
indicated in New Labour’s reform were in fact extensions of existing practices and 
frameworks. This was achieved in three ways: first, madness and distress were re-affirmed as 
illnesses; second, coercion and detention continued to be framed as socially progressive, 
permitting the extension of coercion and control of patients; and third, the marketisation of 
healthcare promoted ideals of individual autonomy that work against collectivist and social 
justice principles, casting “mental illness” as a personal, rather than social, problem. 
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An Illness Like Any Other 
Discourses of medicine and illness enable institutions such as psychiatry, law and 
government to represent madness and its treatment as transcendent of social inequalities. For 
example, the early twentieth century saw the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental 
Disorder recommend that psychiatry be recognised as a field of medicine, and therefore 
move from guarding the “mad poor” in squalid and crowded asylums to treating “mental 
illness” in hospitals (Crossley, 2006). The dispersal of psychiatry out of the asylum and into 
general practice was legislatively supported by the Mental Health Act (1959), which, 
crucially, removed the distinction between mental and physical illness (Bluglass, 1978). The 
effect of this legal move was to consolidate psychiatry’s claim that ‘mental disorder was an 
illness and should be treated as such’ (Busfield, 1997, p. 241). Whilst the ‘emerging concept 
of patienthood was seen as beneficial, and with a classless image’ (McCourt-Perring 1993, p. 
31), these policy changes did more to establish psychiatric power than improve the social and 
economic conditions of the newly-termed patients.  
The claim that madness is an illness like any other continues to be used today in 
campaigns against stigma and for further investment in mental health services,
7
 which are 
often described as the NHS’s ‘Cinderella service’ (Mitchell, 2013).8 However, the idea that 
biomedical theories of mental illness reduce stigma and address inequalities rather than 
perpetuate them is fundamentally flawed. For example, Daley, Costa & Ross (2012) have 
shown through a detailed analysis of psychiatric charts that biomedical psychiatric practices 
reproduce social inequalities rather than address them. This is one example of a wealth of 
scholarship examining the racialized, gendered, heteronormative, ableist and classed politics 
                                                          
7 See for example, Whole-Person Care: from Rhetoric to Reality. Achieving Parity Between Mental and Physical Illness, a report by the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists (2013) that was recently discussed in parliament, and Mitchell’s (2013) article concerning funding mental 
health services. 
8
 The class politics of this metaphor are particularly telling. Mental health services are the poor and unrelated relative of the physical/general 
medicine, and must spend time clearly up the household waste (read: patients?). For more on the global neoliberal human waste production 
see Tyler, 2013 and McWade, forthcoming. 
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of psychiatry (see for example Fanon [1968] 1972; Fernando 2010; Kalathil 2007; Mama 
1984; Metzl 2009).  
Mental Health Law as Socially Progressive 
The authors of The Journey to Recovery state that new medication and changes to the law 
enabled deinstitutionalisation. In doing so, the authors represent mental health law as socially 
progressive. This compliments the idea that madness and distress are an illness like any other. 
In the 1950s a new Royal Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency (the Percy 
Commission) laid the conceptual ground for both the closure of all asylums (moving into a 
community based care service) and the legal right to enforce hospitalisation and treatment 
(Barnes, Bowl, & Fisher, 1990; Crossley, 2006). The Percy Commission’s statement on how 
mental disorder interferes with a patient’s ability to determine their own best interests 
‘‘civilizes’ a law that permits forcible treatment, and places the actions of those carrying out 
the law in the context of acting for the patient’s own good . . . creating a new moral climate 
around the use of compulsion’ (Barnes, Bowl, & Fisher, 1990, p. 16). Echoing this analysis, 
Pilgrim (2012) argues that ‘[f]or those adopting this view, whether professionals, politicians 
or their voting public, the very existence of ‘mental health’ legislation inherently represents a 
form of social progress’ (p. 69). Pilgrim (2012) places ‘mental health’ in quotation marks to 
indicate that such legislation is not concerned with health but disorder.  
A new Mental Health Act was passed in 1983 that gave the state further powers to legally 
detain and treat people with mental health problems without consent. By the 1990s, hospital 
closures meant that there were fewer beds available for patients. Thus beds became solely 
reserved for people being sectioned under the Mental Health Act, and acute psychiatric wards 
became ‘holding units for risky patients’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010, p. 221). In response, the 
amendments to the Mental Health Act made in 2007 would address the “problem” of how to 
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control these patients in the community, by allowing treatment without consent to take place 
outside of the ward: ‘a version of this ‘long leash’ approach to the surveillance and control of 
non-compliant patients outside of hospital’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010, p. 222).  
Thus, the slow and gradual move to care in the community involved the ‘expansion by 
psychiatry into increasing areas of life, increasingly defining social deviancy as mental illness 
and emphasising control of symptoms’ (McCourt-Perring 1993, p. 33). This was represented 
as a socially progressive alternative to the total institution, which had become irrevocably 
stigmatised. The language of “health” is used to obscure the underpinning discourse of 
mental “disorder” in legislation; the net result being that enforced “care” is represented as in 
both the patient and public interest. 
Individual Self-Responsibility 
The Journey to Recovery indicates that one of the targets set for modernising mental health 
services is increased communication and partnership between mental health and social care 
organisations. However, the psychiatrisation of madness and distress relies upon the 
continued separation of these two areas. The move to care in the community, under Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979-1990), was facilitated by this distinction (see The 
Griffiths Report 1983, and NHS and Community Care Act of 1990). The ongoing splitting of 
health problems from social problems fitted neatly with their neoliberal free-market ideology, 
which entails a discourse of individual self-responsibility.
9
  
Val Gillies has argued that neoliberalism ‘requires people to embrace their individualised 
citizenship and become ‘responsible risk takers’’ (2005, p. 837).  For Gillies (and many 
others), the idea that the self-responsible citizen will flourish economically, culturally, 
                                                          
9
 In his history of the NHS Charles Webster traces the beginnings of the neoliberal discourse of self-responsibility to the Labour government 
of the 1970s, who published Prevention and Health: Everybody’s Business in 1976, which accused the public of ‘bringing ill health upon 
themselves and thereby wasting the resources of the NHS’ (Webster, 1998, pp. 137-138). 
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physically, socially and psychically through taking responsible risks informs a culture of 
blame in which ‘poverty and disadvantage is associated with poor self-management’ (ibid.). 
This provides symbolic strength to the argument for marketisation in which the “burden” of 
those in poverty and/or living with illness or disabilities is no longer borne by “tax-payers.” 
This problematic distinction between people who are ill, disabled or unemployed and “hard-
working taxpayers” as if they were different groups of people continues to feature heavily in 
Conservative politics today (Jensen & Tyler, forthcoming). In contradiction to the idea that 
illness is classless, then, the prevailing neoliberal socio-economic agenda frames madness 
and distress as consequent of irresponsible behaviours and choices that need to be controlled 
and contained. As I will show below, the enactment of recovery-as-policy fits well with this 
ideal of individual self-responsible citizen. 
Ideals of Choice and Citizenship 
I have shown that whilst heralding a new age of social inclusion and care in the community, 
mental health policy and legislation under New Labour actually entailed increased social 
exclusion coupled with increased compulsion and control of patients. The use of discourses 
of modernisation and patient-centred healthcare (recovery) served to both disguise this 
extension and make space for its implementation. Building on a history of medicalisation, 
legislation and marketisation, recovery-as-policy enacts psychiatric patients within a paradox 
in which the ideal of choice obscures increasingly repressive legislation that extends the 
powers of psychiatrists to detain and treat people against their will.  
This co-option of recovery to reassert psychiatric power can be understood as a practice of 
‘state building’ (Blitz cited in Tyler, 2010, p. 62) that involves ‘the revocation of the rights to 
citizenship’ (ibid.). The form of citizenship enacted in mental health policy and legislation 
requires autonomous and rational individuals that take responsibility for their own behaviour 
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by making the “right” choices. Because there are “wrong” choices, some individuals are 
‘designed to fail’ (Tyler, 2010, p. 61) as citizens, and as regards British citizenship and 
mental helath, statistical evidence reveals that Black and Black-British men “fail” the most 
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2013; Pilgrim & Tomasini, 2012).
10
 To further 
elaborate the enactment of recovery-as-policy in the UK’s mental health system, we therefore 
need an intersectional analysis of ideals of citizenship and choice enacted in mental health 
policy and law. 
Autonomous Individuals 
Jeannette Pols (2006) has shown that there are different enactments of citizenship and 
choice made possible in different mental healthcare practices. In her study within a 
psychiatric hospital in the Netherlands, she found that patients were given choices, but only 
as long as social norms and values were observed. In contemporary mental healthcare, she 
argues,  
the first thing to be strengthened and developed is individuality and specific 
individual competences, so that the individual may become sociable later. 
‘‘Participation in the community’’ seems to imply the addition of new individuals 
who are taught how to behave, leaving the community ‘‘out there’’ to function as 
before. (2006, p. 98: emphasis added).  
According to Pols (2006) becoming a citizen is enacted as a matter of choice in which an 
individual’s capacity for social inclusion is predicated on their ability to be autonomous. In 
this form of citizenship madness and distress ‘are private particularities [that] leave skills and 
independence untouched, or are irrelevant to self-actualization’ (p. 99). The problem Pols 
                                                          
10
 The report by the House of Commons Health Committee uses various terms from ‘black and minority ethnic’, ‘Mixed, Black and Black 
British groups’, ‘black communities’, ‘Black Caribbean, Black African and other Black groups’ and ‘migrant communities’ in their 
discussion of ethnicity and mental health law (2013, p. 33). They offer no details on how the data discussed was collected, including what 
each term or classification means. I have reproduced their terms here, acknowledging that it is unlikely that they are referring to Black as a 
political identification. This questions concerning terminology and statistical evidence requires further research and analysis that is beyond 
the scope of this article, which I intend to carry out. 
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(2006) finds with these enactments of citizenship is that ‘[i]t is unclear how the autonomous 
individuals can relate to one another, apart from not hindering each other’ (p. 98); autonomy 
pits people’s differences against one another. Even when increased sociality is the goal of 
self-actualisation it is secondary to strengthening the individual.  
Patients must become citizens by conforming to, not by expanding what counts as a 
citizen, or what could count according to day-to-day collective negotiations. The implication 
of this is that autonomous choosing individual citizens are the same as each other. These 
forms of standardisation are marginalising and excluding. Furthermore, the respect for 
personal choice only stretches so far, and is classified according to presiding norms and 
values (which are white, masculinist, middle-class, etc.). Thus, the provision of choice creates 
the very possibility of deviance; there is a “right” choice and a “wrong” one. Autonomy is 
attributed to patients only when they continue to make the “right” choices in terms of self-
care. The ideal of choice and its conflation with responsibility thus creates the very 
possibility for the removal of choice.  Choice is contingent on conformity. As Diana Rose has 
observed, ‘For all that [recovery] goals are meant to be “personal”, certain goals are not 
permitted. You cannot decide to go to bed for a month’ (2014, p. 217). 
The Care Programme Approach 
In the UK, the Care Programme Approach (CPA) is an example of these neoliberal 
enactments of choice and citizenship. The Care Programme Approach is a form of case 
management that was introduced into mental health services in 1991 to meet the challenges 
of co-ordinating multi-disciplinary care in the community. In The Journey to Recovery the 
CPA is described as ‘central to Government policy’ (Department of Health, 2001, p. 8) in 
ensuring continuity of care after a patient has been discharged. Although the document details 
that the CPA was ‘not working’ (ibid.), the new National Standard Framework for Mental 
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Health (NSFMH) (Department of Health, 1999) continued to include it as an important part 
of managing ‘people with severe mental illness’ (p. 41).11 It is important to note that in the 
NSFMH people are sorted into different categories according to their relationship to mental 
health, from those with ‘common mental health problems’ (Department of Health, 1999, p. 
28) to those with ‘severe mental illness’ (ibid., p. 41). As noted earlier, retaining the language 
of illness makes space for treatment without consent as for both the “good” of public health 
and the person who is “ill.”  
 
The new NSFMH contained two standards (four and five) pertaining to those with “severe 
mental illness” that centre on planning for care in both a crisis and after hospitalisation, 
which are summarised in The Journey to Recovery in a section entitled ‘...if we use specialist 
mental health services’ (Department of Health, 2001, p. 15: emphasis added). The rhetorical 
use of an inclusive “we” draws on the discourse of inclusion in which some of “us” use 
specialist mental health services, and this is an unremarkable or normal part of community 
life:  
We will then be involved in agreeing a care plan, which identifies our needs and how 
they can best be met, what we think our recovery goals should be, and what should 
happen if we experience a crisis. Care plans should recognise our broader social 
needs. (Department of Health, 2001, p. 15: emphasis added) 
If “we” need specialist mental health intervention, then “we” will be placed on a CPA. This is 
euphemism for when people are detained under the Mental Health Act 2007; they become a 
case to be managed and will be engaged in that case management as subjects of choice. In the 
                                                          
11
 As I noted earlier, new National Standard Frameworks were introduced as part of the The NHS Plan (2000) 




age of care in the community, a marketised form of healthcare positions mental health 
service-users as choosing consumers of services that will meet their needs.  
This enactment of patient as consumer elides the circumstances under which the patient 
came to be enacted as a subject of choice in the first place. Being “sectioned” under the 
Mental Health Act is precisely the removal of choice. Thus the CPA reinstates choice as an 
ideal, positioning patients as self-responsible subjects. This is done through limiting what the 
patient may choose from to a set of health and social care services. Concurrently, the patient 
is also enacted as a citizen and placed within a contractual agreement to manage their 
problems appropriately. The nature of appropriate self-management will be delineated by the 
expertise of the health and social care service providers they have chosen to rely on in crisis 
and in recovery. Any breach of this contract and their problems will again be managed for 
them through coercion. The CPA is thus a socio-material realisation of the discourse of self-
responsibility that co-occurs with the ideal of choice in healthcare. Responsibility is defined 
in relation to irresponsibility, and this means madness and distress continue to be understood 
as a consequence of mis-management of the self. 
The CPA is a “situation of choice” (Mol, 2008) in mental healthcare that encompasses a 
set of socio-material practices that enact mental health and mental health service-users in 
specific ways. Firstly, it enacts a person as having diverse “needs” that can be met by 
choosing from a selection of different mental health and social care services and products; the 
patient-as-consumer. Secondly, it enacts people with serious mental health problems as ones 
who should be working towards recovery and making plans in case of crisis; the patient-as-
responsible-citizen.  
The subject of a CPA must choose according to their needs, but as Pilgrim observes there 
are different enactments of need: 
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‘Patient-centeredness’, now at the top of the health policy agenda more widely, 
inherently focuses on voluntarism and mutually negotiated decision making between 
patients and professionals. Such an emphasis is on ‘expressed need’, whereas 
psychiatric decision making, backed up by legislative powers and expectations, 
requires an emphasis on ‘defined need’; it is an explicitly legitimised form of parens 
patriae. Logically and pragmatically, it is not, and cannot, be a negotiation between 
equal citizens. (2012, p. 73) 
Furthermore, whilst The Journey of Recovery commits to the idea that health problems are 
linked to social inequality, in the context of a CPA ‘broader social needs’ (Department of 
Health, 2001, p. 15) may be ‘recognised’ (ibid.) but this does not impel further action. 
Because mental health continues to be articulated as “health” and a ‘clinical priority’ 
(Department of Health, 2001, p. 1) the focus continues to be on the autonomous subject with 
individual problems that are best met by psychiatric services and through self-responsibility.  
Engagement and Compulsion 
Recovery-as-policy focuses on medicine compliance (Moncrieff, 2003; Spandler & 
Calton, 2009). Indeed, standards four and five of the NSFMH include a commitment to the 
use of “anti-psychotic” medication as soon as possible with people experiencing psychotic 
episodes: 
Prompt assessment is essential for young people with the first signs of a psychotic 
illness, where there is growing evidence that early assessment and treatment can 
reduce levels of morbidity . . . There is also evidence that delaying treatment with 
antipsychotic medication leads to poorer long term outcome for individuals with 
schizophrenic illness. Better public and professional understanding, together with 
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integrated mental health systems across primary and specialist services, will promote 
earlier intervention. (Department of Health, 1999, p. 44)
12
 
This emphasis on “early intervention” is also referred to in The Journey to Recovery, in 
which early intervention teams for young people experiencing a first episode of psychosis 
will provide ‘help and advice on managing symptoms, and will base their care on the belief 
that engagement, rather than compulsion, is the key to success’ (Department of Health, 2001, 
p. 21: emphasis added). However, the terminology of “symptom management” remains, and 
the term “engagement” indicates a set of disciplinary techniques that are a kind of 
compulsion. This is a far cry from the self-definition fought for by psychiatric survivors and 
other mental health activists. Compulsion remains as an absent present, and if someone 
becomes “hard to engage” they will still be easy to coerce. For example, in the NSFMH, it is 
stated that ‘[s]ome people with severe and enduring mental illness find it difficult to engage 
with and maintain contact with services, posing a risk to themselves or to others’ 
(Department of Health, 1999, p. 43: emphasis added). The risk these people pose is situated 
as lack of engagement; therefore there is no choice because if one chooses to disengage the 
medical professional response will be forced engagement with services. Spandler & Calton 
(2009) argue that what is implicit in the legal-medico alliance enacted in New Labour’s 
policies is ‘a conscious or tacit acceptance of a new body of psychiatric knowledge which 
defines the parameters of both ‘recovery’ and ‘inclusion’’ (p. 252). 
Designed to Fail 
In her analysis of the 1981 Nationality Act, Imogen Tyler has argued, ‘British citizenship 
has been designed to fail specific groups and populations’ (2010, p. 61: original emphasis). 
This failure is ‘foundational to British citizenship’ (2010, p. 62) as part of a wider 
                                                          
12 There is notable longitudinal research that shows that early and continued use of neuroleptics actually decreases the possibility of 
recovery, e.g. Jablensky et al (1992) and Desisto et al. (1995). 
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redistribution of resources and rights away from the majority and into ‘the hands of the social 
and political elites’ (ibid.). The 1981 Nationality Act redrew the lines as to who could claim 
British citizenship, removing the right from those living in former British colonies. Tyler 
details how this the Act racialized national belonging, and is therefore an example of what 
Foucault termed ‘state racism’ (ibid.), in which policy and legislation actively discriminate 
against people according to an essentialist concept of ‘race’.  This politics of race is indelibly 
linked to class: ‘The 1981 Act produced ‘ethnic hierarchies’ in Britain, which, combined with 
existing class divisions, led to civil unrest. This in turn enabled minorities to be constituted as 
a ‘threat to the social body’ and targeted through policing and reform’ (Tyler, 2010, p. 64, 
citing Nelson, 2008). 
  
Drawing upon this argument, I contend that the mental health legislation and policy 
analysed above can likewise be read as part of this racialized and classed design of British 
citizenship through the creation of failed subjects. Pilgrim and Tomasini (2012) have argued 
that failure in mental health legislation is characterised as ‘un-reason’ (p. 634). They contend 
that mental health law cannot be accurately be described as justice because it is 
discriminatory, highlighting inequalities in detention along race, class and gendered lines 
(Pilgrim & Tomasini, 2012).  For example, data concerning those sectioned under the Mental 
Health Act (2007) demonstrates that those living in poverty, and especially Black men, are 
disproportionately sectioned in comparison to the rest of society (Pilgrim & Tomasini, 2012). 
In their 2013 post-legislative appraisal of Mental Health Act (2007), the House of Commons 
Health Committee found that since the act was passed there has been ‘a substantial increase 
in the detained patient population’, p. 3). Furthermore, ‘it is notable that the number of Black 
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and Black British patients subject to CTOs is even more disproportionate than the number 
detained in psychiatric hospitals’ (ibid., p. 5).13  
In mental health, specific people who do not meet the ideals of rationality, autonomy and 
individuality have been ‘designed to fail’ (Tyler, 2010, p. 61). These ideals are colonial, 
heteropatriarchal, and capitalist and inform the creation of a global detention complex that 
includes prisons, immigration detention centres, and institutions that detain disabled and 
psychiatrised people (Ben-Moshe, Chapman, and Carey, 2014; Lloyd et al., 2012). In the 
edited collection Beyond Walls and Cages: Prisons, Borders, and Global Crisis, Jenna  Lloyd 
et al argue that ‘the militarization of national boundaries and policing practices . . . prevents 
us from seeing the ways in which citizenship, incapacitation, and punishment work together, 
within and across national boundaries, to legally consign entire groups of people 
[disproportionately Black men and migrants] to precarious futures and premature deaths’ 
(2012, p. 4).  
 
Recovery-as-policy, with its commitment to the ideal of choice and citizenship, polices the 
crisis in psychiatric power brought about by rights-based movements by further criminalizing 
unreason and shoring up the idea that the “mentally ill” represent a threat to society. In doing 
so, the enactment of recovery-as-policy facilitates the removal of resources and rights for 
“mad” people, and as Costa (2009) rightly claims: ‘we don’t have recovery if we don’t have 
rights’. 
Conclusion 
Tyler (2013) has argued that changes such as the ones I have described above are 
consequent forms of neoliberal policy-making which ostensibly attempt to deregulate stat 
                                                          
13
 CTO means Community Treatment Order, meaning they are treated without consent (if necessary) outside of the hospital ward. 
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controls through the introduction of market mechanisms into welfare systems. In the case of 
the proposed changes to mental health policy analysed here, the idea of the ‘bad’ and 
outmoded welfare state (national mental health services) is located in that shameful history of 
neglect materialised in the total institution of the asylum. The neoliberal ideology posits that 
market capitalism will save us all from the abuses of state control through systems of 
devolved power, individual responsibility and choice. However, in actuality the ‘modes of 
surveillance and control hybridized and multiplied . . . on the one hand, neoliberal political 
discourses are state-phobic, and on the other hand neoliberalism demands continuous, 
repressive interventions by the state’ (Tyler, 2013, p. 6). This is exemplified in the paradox 
faced by people experiencing madness or distress whom are promised individual freedoms 
within a system that increasingly threatens those freedoms through the unrealisable ideals of 
free and rational choice. 
 
In this paper, I have offered an analysis of recovery-as-policy beginning with New 
Labour’s reforms of the NHS, which in the area of mental health was referred to as The 
Journey to Recovery. I have shown that the government told a particular history of mental 
healthcare in UK that was one of neglect, and yet made no mention of psychiatric practices 
that are harmful at best and fatal at worst. I argued that this is because the new policy and 
NSFMH laid the ground for new mental health legislation that would be increasingly 
repressive. Overall, this tension between patient-centred policy focussed on the ideal of 
choice on the one hand and the legal right to detain and treat patients without their consent on 
the other enacts those who identify as mad within a paradox. Highlighting the inequalities in 
distribution of detention and coercion, I have argued that recovery-as-policy is a form of 




In the years following the uptake of recovery in the UK mental health practice, we receive 
repeated reports that the mental health system continues to be in “crisis”. I caution against 
this discourse as one that is used to reassert the chokehold biomedical psychiatric practices 
and state legislation have in determining how mental health service-users should live their 
lives. This story silences and marginalizes alternatives (Ben-Moshe, 2014).  
 
If detention and exclusion are constitute elements of the global neoliberal complex, in 
what ways might activists forge links between movements such as No Borders and prison 
abolition? Crucial work in developing these connections around madness and mass 
incarceration has begun with the publication of Disability Incarcerated (2014), and emerging 
scholarship which seeks to highlight the connections between multiple forms of 
disenfranchisement, dispossession and social injustice (see for example, Tyler, 2013; Lloyd et 
al., 2012; McWade, Milton and Beresford, 2015).Could we, like Angela Davis and Gina Dent 
(2001) do for prisons, conceptualise psychiatric services as a state border, through which 
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